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Abstract 
 
Numerous critics have charged that the practice of minority districting, by weakening the 
electoral incentives central to representative behavior, leads legislators to be less responsive to 
constituency opinion. Using data on referenda and initiative voting to estimate constituency 
preferences in each of California’s 80 Assembly districts, I assess the correspondence between 
district opinion and roll call voting for legislators from majority-minority and majority-white 
districts. I show that constituency preferences can explain the voting decisions of legislators 
equally well across districts. Despite the low levels of competition and voter turnout found in 
majority-minority districts, legislators from these districts are no less responsive to the policy 
demands of their constituents.   Gay 
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For more than two decades, the creation of majority-minority districts has been an 
important tool for increasing the representation of minority interests in state legislatures and the 
US Congress. Where minority voters are concentrated in numbers sufficient to “elect 
representatives of their choice,” legislators are expected to be uniquely responsive to the policy 
preferences of these non-white constituents. The empirical evidence suggests that (Democratic) 
legislators from majority-minority districts in fact are more likely to support a progressive public 
policy agenda, including initiatives thought to benefit minority Americans in particular (e.g., 
Hero and Tolbert 1995; Lublin 1997). Yet the practice of minority districting is not without its 
critics. A number of observers have argued that the electoral security enjoyed by legislators from 
majority-minority districts undermines the legislative responsiveness such districts were meant to 
ensure (Guinier 1994; Swain 1995; Thernstrom 1987). With low turnout and few contested 
elections, majority-minority districts may insulate incumbents from the consequences of failing 
to respond to the will of their constituents, allowing these legislators more discretion in policy 
decisions. Rather than reproduce their district’s majority opinion, legislators from majority-
minority districts instead may follow their hearts or perhaps yield more readily to intra-party 
pressures.  At issue is not whether these legislators tend toward liberalism, particularly on issues 
salient to non-white constituents; on that point, there is little disagreement. The question is how 
closely this voting behavior corresponds to the expressed preferences of the constituents they 
represent. To what extent do constituents determine the policy decisions of legislators from 
majority-minority districts?   
This paper considers the effect of minority districting on legislators’ responsiveness to 
constituency opinion.  Comparing legislators from majority-minority and majority-white 
districts, I measure how closely roll call behavior, including the well-documented tendency Gay 
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toward liberalism among majority-minority representatives, reflects the expressed preferences of 
district voters.  I examine, in particular, the correspondence between legislators’ voting patterns 
in the California State Assembly and citizens’ votes on statewide ballot propositions, a measure 
of constituency preferences that is more direct and multidimensional than the demographic 
proxies commonly used in the literature on minority districting. The analysis finds no substantial 
difference across districts in the effect of constituency opinion on legislative behavior.  
Constituency preferences explain the vote choices of legislators from majority-white and 
majority-minority districts equally well. Moreover, liberal (or conservative) shifts in 
constituency opinion produce equally large shifts in the ideological positions of legislators from 
majority-minority and majority-white districts.  Despite the electoral security offered by 
majority-minority districts, legislators from these districts are no less responsive to the policy 
demands of their constituents.  
Minority Districting and the Problem of Electoral Security 
In the debate over the merits and legitimacy of racial redistricting, critics of majority-
minority districts often point to the unintended consequences of concentrating minority voters, 
typically African Americans and Latinos, in districts where they comprise more than 50 percent 
(and often more than 65 percent) of the population. Attention has focused, in particular, on the 
limited electoral competition and low voter turnout that are widely viewed as defining features of 
districts with Black or Latino majorities. Because race and ethnicity are important predictors of 
partisan vote choice, with blacks and most Latino subgroups reliably supporting Democratic 
candidates, the number of non-white voters in a district has a significant negative effect on the 
level of competition (Weber 2000).  Not only does the partisan imbalance characteristic of Gay 
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heavily minority districts contribute to uncompetitive general elections, but incumbents from 
“packed, safe districts” (Guinier 1994) rarely face strong primary challengers (Canon 1999).
1   
This lack of competition, in turn, is partly responsible for the low voter turnout observed 
in majority-minority districts (Brace et al. 1995). By exposing the irrelevance of turnout to 
electoral outcomes, uncompetitive districts discourage participation and reduce the incentive for 
candidates or parties to mobilize voters (Campbell 1996). Turnout in minority districts is 
inhibited still further by the social and economic dislocation common to areas with large black 
and Latino populations;  these districts often pack together residents who lack the resources, 
namely education and income, known to facilitate participation (Gay 2001).
2  The unique 
opportunity that majority-minority districts offer for minority electoral self-determination only 
partially offsets, at least among non-white voters, the decrease in turnout associated with non-
competitive electoral environments (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Gay 2001). Among white 
residents, voter turnout in majority-minority districts is lower than that observed in similarly 
uncompetitive and socio-economically disadvantaged districts (Gay 2001). Hence, in 1994, over 
60 percent of the contested majority-minority congressional districts ranked in the lowest quintile 
in terms of voter participation (Campbell 1996). 
With limited competition and low voter turnout, Swain (1995) and others contend that 
racial redistricting effectively immunizes legislators against the electoral incentives considered 
central to representative behavior.  Relieved of the preoccupation with reelection, legislators 
from heavily minority districts are said to enjoy more freedom in their decision-making, less 
constrained by the need to reproduce their district’s majority opinion—or even to invest much 
effort in legislative work—in order to secure the majority of the vote. While this “immunity” 
may contribute to either ideological or participatory shirking—for example, Swain (1995) Gay 
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describes a legislator nicknamed “The Phantom” for his record of absenteeism and failure to 
sponsor many bills—attention has focused on its implications for the policy congruence between 
legislators and constituents.  This article as well is concerned strictly with policy voting.  
To date, the evidence suggesting that the weak electoral constraints in majority-minority 
districts compromise the relationship between constituency preferences and legislative behavior 
is limited and often anecdotal.
3  In arguing that legislators from majority-minority districts have 
“great personal freedom to advance their own personal political agendas,” Swain (1995) cites the 
examples of legislators whose defense of the Soviet Union (George Crockett of Detroit) or 
reticence on civil rights (Robert Nix of Philadelphia) put them at odds with opinion in their 
districts; legislators whose policy activism, while not directly at odds with district opinion, is 
focused primarily on issues (e.g. foreign aid) that do not bear on the interests of their 
constituents; and legislators who vow to place institutional or party responsibilities above their 
responsibilities to their districts (William Gray of Philadelphia). But there are also examples of 
legislators from majority-minority districts who do not pursue such an individualistic style, 
choosing instead to seek close counsel with constituents (Canon 1999; Fenno 2003).  Equally 
telling are the examples of legislators—including Swain’s (1995) “Phantom”—whose lack of 
responsiveness eventually is met by crushing defeat in subsequent primary elections. Whatever 
freedom these districts afford their elected representatives, it remains unclear whether the 
strategy of concentrating minority voters, on balance, has a negative effect on the caliber of 
policy representation.   
Despite a vast literature on representation in majority-minority districts, questions about 
the strength of the relationship between constituency preferences and legislative behavior in 
these districts have not been addressed directly.  In fact, empirical tests of constituency influence Gay 
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on legislative decision-making rarely reach beyond an examination of the correspondence 
between a district’s percent minority—considered an indicator of district opinion and ideological 
tendencies—and roll call voting. Thus, attention has focused on the propensity of legislators 
from districts with sizable minority populations to vote for or against progressive legislation in 
general and bills favored by minority interest groups in particular (e.g. Hero and Tolbert 1995; 
Lublin 1997).  This research has established that the size of the minority population is positively 
correlated with progressive voting, a result cited as evidence of legislators’ responsiveness to 
constituency preferences.  
But the relationship between minority population size and roll call voting, while making 
clear that legislators elected from predominantly minority (read: liberal) districts are more likely 
to support a liberal public policy agenda than are legislators elected from predominantly white 
(read: conservative) districts, does not resolve whether constituency influence on legislative 
decision making is equally strong across districts. To the contrary, models that specify a single, 
linear relationship between percent minority and roll call voting assume, by definition, that 
constituency influence is stable. Notably, several scholars have departed from this approach, 
identifying a host of factors—including region, legislator’s race and party, and nature of the 
vote—that alternately enhance or diminish constituency influence on legislative decision making 
(Hutchings 1998; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Whitby 1997; Whitby and Krause 
2001). This research, however, has not considered minority districting among the factors that 
condition the behavior of legislators vis-à-vis their constituencies.  To what extent are the policy 
choices made by legislators from majority-minority districts influenced by constituency opinion? 
The tendency toward liberalism aside, what is of interest here is how constituency influence may 
wax and wane with the size of the minority population.   Gay 
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Expectations regarding the effect of minority districting on legislators’ responsiveness to 
constituency preferences depend, in part, on beliefs about the mechanisms of constituency 
influence.  Implicit in the concerns expressed about the deleterious, if unintended, consequences 
of minority districting is a model of representation in which constituency influence results from 
legislators’ efforts to represent their constituents’ positions in order to win reelection. Research 
on Congress provides empirical support for the general proposition that legislators are motivated 
by their desire for reelection and that such concerns govern their responsiveness to public 
opinion (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2001; Griffin 2006; but see Bartels 1991). One indication of 
the importance of the “electoral connection” is recent evidence showing a high incidence of 
ideological (and participatory) shirking among legislators serving their last term in office 
(Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The electoral quietude that comes with concentrating minority 
voters removes the chief incentive legislators have for following public opinion: the probability 
of enhancing their reelection prospects. Unencumbered by reelection concerns, legislators from 
majority-minority districts are freer to focus on their own conception of the common good and to 
vote in ways contrary to public opinion.  Ironically, to the extent that legislators from majority-
minority districts also benefit from what one legislator described as “the blind faith” (Fenno 
1977, 912) that comes from descriptively representing their constituents, immunity from 
electoral concerns means in effect that majority-minority legislators feel unconstrained by 
constituents who may nonetheless feel “close” to and “proud of” them (see also Tate 2003). As 
one such legislator explained, “My constituents don’t know how I vote, but they know me and 
they trust me” (as quoted in Fenno 1977, 912; italics in original).  If the threat of electoral defeat 
is the primary mechanism by which constituents can influence legislative decision making, then Gay 
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the logical expectation is for minority districting to weaken the relationship between 
constituency opinion and legislative behavior.  
The threat of electoral defeat, however, is one of two mechanisms available to 
constituents for ensuring legislators’ responsiveness to their preferences. Constituents may also 
exert influence over legislators by electing like-minded representatives, a pattern more common 
in ideologically homogenous districts (Erikson 1978; Fearon 1999; Hutchings, McClerking, and 
Charles 2004). Legislators whose own preferences mirror those of their constituents can be 
expected to make policy decisions consistent with district opinion. Whether they represent 
districts that are “cheap seats” (Campbell 1996), with limited electoral competition and low voter 
turnout, is irrelevant. Even when their reelection prospects are not at stake, the level of 
responsiveness would be high. The same legislator who considered himself unconstrained by his 
constituents, also viewed himself as a “microcosm” of his district:  
I don’t have any trouble knowing what [the district] thinks or wants…When I vote my 
conscience, I vote right for the district. If I voted against civil rights legislation, my 
people would probably ask me why I did that. But I never would do it (as quoted in 
Fenno 1977, 912).  
 
Thus, the expectation, based on this conception of constituency influence, is that the relationship 
between constituency opinion and roll call voting will be as strong in majority-minority districts 
as elsewhere.  
Measuring Constituency Preferences and Legislative Responsiveness 
In order to compare districts on the strength of the relationship between legislator’s 
voting record and constituents’ preferences, the first challenge is to identify a reliable measure of 
constituency opinion. With few exceptions, scholars have relied on select social and economic 
characteristics—such as racial composition, urbanism, median household income—as proxies for 
district opinion, the assumption being that voters’ non-policy attributes correlate with their Gay 
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policy preferences and that majority opinion in a district can be described by an additive linear 
function of these attributes. At best these measures are blunt tools. For the questions examined 
here, they also are of limited analytical use. Once districts are sorted by their majority-minority 
or majority-white status, there is insufficient variation on the demographic indicators 
(particularly among majority-minority districts) to differentiate effectively among the districts 
within each category. The lack of demographic variation may conceal substantive differences in 
constituency opinion, leading us to underestimate the correspondence between opinion and roll 
call voting. Furthermore, using racial composition to both classify districts and to measure 
district opinion makes it impossible for demographic characteristics and electoral environment to 
be assessed separately from district opinion as influences on legislators’ decisions. The challenge 
is to identify a measure of constituency opinion that is more precise and informative than the 
demographic surrogates, and that allows for its effects to be separated adequately from other 
features of a district.  
Several scholars have proposed the use of referendum voting returns as an alternative to 
the reliance on demographics for measuring constituents’ preferences (Gerber and Lewis 2004; 
Kuklinski 1978; Lewis 1998; McDonagh 1993; Snyder 1996, 2005).  This approach offers 
several advantages that make it well suited to the questions examined here. Rather than the 
inferential leaps implicit in the use of demographic proxies, citizens’ choices on ballot initiatives 
and referenda are behaviors that directly express their policy preferences (Kuklinski 1978).
4  As 
votes on specific policy proposals and as decisions with real lawmaking consequences, these 
vote choices are in important ways comparable to representatives’ roll call votes. When 
aggregated, information from initiatives and referenda capture multiple dimensions of 
constituency preferences, with more specificity than a linear combination of a district’s socio-Gay 
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economic characteristics. The result is a more precise description of the preference signals that 
the public sends to policy makers.
5 In addition to enabling sharper inferences about constituency 
opinion, preference measures derived from votes on ballot propositions make it possible to 
disentangle demographic characteristics from constituency opinion as influences on legislative 
behavior. In evaluating whether legislators in majority-minority and majority-white districts 
respond equally to the will of their constituents, I use voting returns from propositions to 
measure constituency preferences.  
With constituency preferences measured, I assess legislative responsiveness on the basis 
of how effectively constituency preferences predict roll call voting.  Specifically, I compare 
legislators from majority-minority and majority-white districts on the predictive power of the 
preference estimates and on the magnitude of their effects on voting behavior.  In models of roll 
call voting, the coefficients on the preference estimates capture, at least in a statistical sense, the 
extent to which public preferences directly influence policy voting. If legislators from minority 
districts exercise more discretion in their decision-making, free from the electoral concerns that 
constrain the choices of other legislators and ensure their responsiveness, then we would expect 
to see significant differences in the predictive power of the preference estimates across types of 
districts; less predictive in majority-minority districts, more in majority-white. While roll call 
votes may not be directly at odds with constituency preferences in majority-minority districts, the 
measured effect of preferences on voting should be relatively small compared to its effect among 
legislators from majority-white districts. However, if constituents from majority-minority 
districts are successful in electing like-minded legislators, then despite the electoral quietude of 
these districts we would not expect significant differences in the predictive power or estimated 
effects of constituency preferences.  Gay 
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Even with the benefit of more refined estimates of constituency preferences, this analysis 
confronts an inferential challenge common to all correlational studies of representation (see 
Achen 1978). Votes on referenda and initiatives may be commensurate with but are not directly 
comparable to roll call votes. As a result, the statistical correlation between constituency 
preferences and representatives’ voting patterns indicates only the relative, not absolute, degree 
of correspondence between the two. With constituency preferences and legislative behavior 
measured on different scales, it is possible to estimate a high correlation even if, as Snyder 
(1996) points out, “all representatives are to the left of their constituents’ mean ideal point” 
(482).  Yet, for the questions examined here, the relative degree of correspondence is a useful 
statistic in comparing the responsiveness of legislators across districts. Importantly, whatever 
caveats apply to correlational studies of this kind, apply equally to the analysis of majority-
minority and majority-white districts and, hence, can not account for any differences observed 
between these district types; such differences are the sole concern of this article.  
Data and Estimation of Constituency Preferences 
I study legislative responsiveness with data from California, measuring the effect of 
constituency opinion on roll call voting behavior during the 1997-1998 session of the California 
State Assembly. The state is selected for several reasons. Because of its widespread use of the 
initiative process, California offers a wealth of information—to researchers and politicians—
about voter preferences on a wide range of major policy issues. The State Assembly, a highly 
professional body whose many similarities to the U.S. House enhance the generalizability of the 
results, provides a particularly useful context for the study of minority districting and legislative 
responsiveness. Not only is the Assembly sufficiently large (80 members) to allow for some 
confidence in statistical analyses, but also the legislators represent a diverse mix of districts, Gay 
  11
including (as of the 1997-1998 session) 27 with a majority non-white general population.  These 
districts included 10 majority-Latino districts and 17 districts in which no single racial or ethnic 
group accounted for more than half of the population. (In three of the heterogeneous districts, 
African Americans, while not a majority, constituted the largest minority group.) Moreover, the 
majority-minority Assembly districts exhibit the same pattern of limited competition and low 
voter turnout that is commonly associated with congressional and state legislative districts with 
large minority populations, and that critics contend may undermine legislative responsiveness.
6 
I derive estimates of constituency preferences from votes on statewide ballot propositions 
in the November 1996 election, which immediately preceded the 1997-1998 Assembly session. 
The voting data is aggregated to the level of the assembly district. Fifteen propositions—
including three referenda (all bond measures) put on the ballot by the Legislature, and 12 
initiatives put on the ballot by petition—were voted on in that election. Measures that posed 
questions similar to other propositions on the ballot were excluded from the analysis.
7  The 
remaining 14 ballot measures covered a range of issues, from civil rights to taxation, campaign 
finance reform, health policy, and prison construction.  
The district-level proposition vote percentages were subjected to factor analysis in order 
to recover the policy dimensions responsible for the systematic variation in proposition support 
across districts (Snyder 1996, 2005). By scaling the proposition votes, I derive measures of 
general constituency preferences that are more efficient than using all 14 propositions directly, 
and more informative than demographic proxies.  To improve the estimation of the policy 
dimensions, I include in the factor analysis an additional measure of constituency opinion, the 
district-level Democratic vote for president. A maximum-likelihood factor analysis, with the data 
weighted by voter turnout in the assembly district (Snyder 1996), yielded a three-dimensional Gay 
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spatial model. The first factor accounted for 73 percent of the cross district variance; the addition 
of the second increased the percent of variance explained to 89 percent.  The uniqueness values 
were generally low; for ten of the 15 measures, less than 15 percent of the vote variance was 
unexplained by the three-factor model.  
The varimax-rotated factor loadings describe the information contained in each factor 
(and, by extension, the relative characteristics of each proposition), offering some insight into the 
substantive interpretation of the spatial dimensions.  The first factor loads primarily (i.e. loadings 
over .65) on three propositions: a proposal barring the legislature from imposing any restrictions 
on the rights of attorneys and clients to negotiate fees, including contingent fee arrangements; a 
proposal imposing civil liabilities and authorizing class action suits when securities fraud results 
in losses to individuals’ investments; a health care measure creating a non-profit consumer 
watchdog agency and barring insurers and HMOs from conditioning coverage on patients’ 
agreement to arbitration. The pattern of loadings suggests that this first dimension may capture 
preferences on Consumer Populism. District scores on this first dimension vary with population 
characteristics such as Democratic registration (positively) and region (highest in Southern 
California districts).   
The second factor loads primarily on eight ballot propositions, as well as on the 
Democratic vote for president: a bond issue to improve waterways, and impose water 
conservation and flood control measures; a bond issue to provide farm and home aid to 
California veterans; a constitutional amendment prohibiting affirmative action in public 
employment, education, and contracting; a proposal to raise the minimum wage by $.75; a 
proposal denying recovery of damages to convicted felons, drunk drivers, and uninsured 
motorists in the event of a car accident; a proposal limiting health insurers’ ability to deny care, Gay 
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and increasing staffing requirements at health facilities; a proposal to increase the tax rate on the 
highest income taxpayers; and a constitutional amendment requiring voter approval for any 
increase in property tax rates.  With factor loadings exceeding .90 for votes on affirmative action, 
the minimum wage, and Bill Clinton’s reelection, I interpret this dimension to be a measure of 
constituency Liberalism.
8  That most of the propositions address economic, as opposed to social, 
issues suggests the dimension captures Economic Liberalism in particular. District scores on the 
second factor vary predictably with population characteristics. The scores are positively 
correlated with Democratic registration, the proportion college-educated, and the proportions 
Asian and Latino. (Proportion black is positively correlated but not statistically significant.) 
There is also statistically significant regional variation, with the highest scores in Northern 
California and the lowest in Central California.  These variables explain 87 percent of the 
variation in Economic Liberalism.  
The third factor loads primarily on only two propositions—a campaign finance measure 
limiting contributions to political candidates and imposing voluntary spending caps, and a 
proposal legalizing the medical use of marijuana—which makes it difficult to interpret. 
Moreover, the uniqueness value on one of the measures, the campaign finance proposal, is very 
high: 48 percent of the vote variance on Proposition 208 is unexplained by the spatial model. 
Because this factor is not well specified—and, in fact, may measure nothing more abstract than 
opinion on medical marijuana—I exclude it from the analysis of legislative responsiveness.  
Finally, none of the three factors loads on Proposition 205, a bond issue to finance prison 
construction (mostly in the Central Valley); the measure has a uniqueness value of .89.  The 
district vote on this measure varies only with district location (strong support in the Central 
Valley, weak elsewhere), suggesting that it is strictly a regional issue.  Gay 
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Figure 1 plots the scores of majority-minority and majority-white assembly districts on 
the first and second dimensions.  Districts that include all or part of the state’s better-known 
cities are indicated. On balance, majority-minority districts have higher values on both the 
Economic Liberalism and Consumer Populism dimensions, a structure that is intuitively 
reasonable. Importantly, however, even among majority-minority districts there is variation in 
constituency preferences, especially on issues related to consumer rights.  Moreover, a number of 
majority-minority districts hold high values on the liberalism dimension, but relatively low 
values on the consumer dimension. For example, in Norwalk’s (Los Angeles County) 58
th 
Assembly district, which is 70 percent non-white, constituency opinion on Consumer Populism 
is more similar to opinion in majority-white districts in San Diego and Hayward than to opinion 
in most minority districts, including those in Santa Ana and Fresno with similar demographic 
characteristics.  Yet, in terms of Economic Liberalism, constituency opinion in Norwalk does not 
depart substantially from opinion in most minority districts.  The graphs also reveal the existence 
of majority-minority districts (e.g. San Jaoquin Valley’s 30
th) where constituents exhibit centrist-
to-Conservative tendencies in both their general ideology and their particular opinions regarding 
consumer rights. Such patterns further underscore the limits of demographic proxies as indicators 
of constituency preferences. Constituency preferences are multidimensional and diverse.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences: Predicting Roll Call Votes  
Using the factor scores as measures of constituency preferences, I now consider their 
relationship to legislators’ voting behavior, and the effect of minority districting on this linkage. 
Specifically, I examine whether districts’ scores on Consumer Populism and Economic 
Liberalism predict roll call voting during the 1997-1998 Assembly session. I examine each roll Gay 
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call separately, estimating a logit regression—with the two constituency factor scores as 
predictors—for each of 1614 non-unanimous Assembly floor votes.
9  While district-wide 
constituency preferences in general, and these two imperfect measures in particular, are not 
likely to affect legislators’ votes on every bill, if constituency preferences matter most of the 
time, then across many roll calls these preferences should explain a substantial share of 
legislators’ decisions.
10 For that reason, I present summary statistics of the logit results, focusing 
on the average predictive power of the constituency preference measures.  
Table 1 presents statistics for two measures of goodness of fit: the (average) percent of 
roll call votes correctly classified, where “correct” indicates that the model assigned a probability 
greater than .5 to the member’s actual vote choice; and the (average) proportional reduction in 
error (PRE), which measures the relative improvement in classification success over the 
benchmark prediction that the member simply votes with the majority.
11  On average, 
constituency preferences on economic and consumer rights issues predict legislators’ voting 
patterns in the 1997-1998 session well.  The logits correctly classified an average of 88 percent 
of the votes cast on the non-unanimous roll calls considered.  The PREs are also quite high: on 
average, including the constituency preference measures improves the ability to predict 
legislators’ voting decisions by 46 percent. These summary statistics compare favorably with the 
results of a party-line voting model, in which legislators are predicted to vote with their party’s 
majority. With similar classification rates and PREs, districts’ scores on Consumer Populism and 
Economic Liberalism appear to be at least as effective as members’ party affiliations in 
predicting roll call behavior. Finally, for 91 percent of the sampled roll calls, 
2    likelihood ratio 
tests reject the hypothesis of a chance relationship between constituency preferences and roll call 
voting at the five percent level.  Gay 
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Within each party delegation, the predictive power of constituency preferences is 
reduced, evidence that constituency influences on legislative behavior operate largely through 
their effect on the party affiliation of the elected representative.
12 Note that after controlling for 
party, the number of non-unanimous roll calls (i.e. non-unanimous within each party’s caucus) 
declines dramatically—especially for Democrats (85%), less so for Republicans (34%). 
Nonetheless, even after taking party affiliation into account, constituency preferences remain 
significant predictors of roll call voting. Of primary interest is the roll call behavior of Assembly 
Democrats, who represented 21 of California’s 27 majority-minority districts.  For the subset of 
roll call votes (250) on which the Democratic caucus was not unanimous, models of voting 
behavior that include constituency preferences on economic and consumer rights issues improve 
predictions by 10 percent on average.  In 22 percent of these roll calls, the relationship between 
the preference measures and Democrats’ voting behavior is statistically significant at the five 
percent level.  
Assembly Democrats from majority-minority districts are no less responsive to 
constituency preferences than legislators from majority-white districts. To begin, the sets of non-
unanimous roll calls are equally small for both groups of legislators; despite the variability in 
constituency preferences documented in Figure 1, Democrats from majority-minority districts, 
like those from majority-white districts, were unanimous on over 80 percent of roll calls. Where 
Democrats disagree, the logit results show only small differences in the predictive power of the 
Consumer Populism and Economic Liberalism scores based on the majority-minority status of 
the district. The average PRE for the subset of roll calls (263) on which Democrats from 
majority-minority districts were not unanimous is 18 percent, five percentage points higher than Gay 
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the average PRE for Democrats from majority-white districts. For Democrats from majority-
minority districts, district opinion is a significant predictor of voting in 14 percent of non-
unanimous roll calls, compared with 13 percent of roll calls for majority-white legislators. 
That Democratic legislators are equally responsive to public opinion is also apparent 
from their behavior on the Assembly bills most directly related to specific propositions on the 
November 1996 statewide ballot.  After sorting the non-unanimous roll call votes by subject 
matter (as determined by the bill’s committee of origin), I reestimated the vote choice models, 
using the district vote on a related ballot proposition rather than the constituency factor scores as 
the sole predictor.
13   Table 2 presents results from these logit models. While there are 
differences across issue areas in the extent to which legislators’ votes are guided by constituency 
opinion—for example, votes on public safety matters are the most closely related to past 
initiative votes—on most subjects, the vote choices of majority-minority Democrats are at least 
as responsive to opinion on related initiatives as the choices of Democrats from majority-white 
districts. Thus, on public safety issues, Propositions 213 and 215 on average improve roll call 
predictions by 14 and 15 percent, respectively, for majority-minority Democrats and 9 and 7 
percent for majority-white Democrats. Moreover, in more than one-third of the (non-unanimous) 
public safety roll calls, the district votes on these initiatives are statistically significant (p<.05) 
predictors of vote choice for majority-minority Democrats. By comparison, the initiative votes 
are significant in only one-eighth to one-fifth of the models for majority-white Democrats. Only 
for the handfuls of (non-unanimous) roll calls related to health and to revenue and taxation is 
there evidence that the district vote on specific initiatives is more effective in predicting the 
voting patterns of legislators from majority-white rather than majority-minority districts. On Gay 
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balance, the results from the roll call analysis indicate that majority-minority Democrats are as 
likely as their majority-white colleagues to sense and respond to relevant shifts in public opinion.  
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences: Predicting Policy Orientation 
The roll call data established that constituency preferences on economic and consumer 
rights issues, as well as opinion on specific policy proposals, are significant predictors of 
Assembly voting, and can explain the voting patterns of Democratic legislators from majority-
white and majority-minority districts equally well.  Among these legislators, vote decisions in 14 
percent of all non-unanimous roll calls depend in part on their constituents’ orientations toward 
Consumer Populism and Economic Liberalism. And in at least one policy area in particular, 
public safety, constituents’ specific policy preferences, as expressed by their votes on related 
ballot measures, influence decisions in up to one-third of the legislators’ non-unanimous roll 
calls on the issue. Having determined that preferences affect behavior—presumably, by leading 
legislators to take more liberal (conservative) positions when district opinion is more liberal 
(conservative)—I now consider the magnitude of this effect. Do districts’ scores on Consumer 
Populism and Economic Liberalism have as large an influence on the policy positions of 
legislators from majority-minority districts as on the positions of legislators who represent 
majority-white constituencies?  
Rather than compare effect sizes on individual roll calls, I scale votes to construct a 
summary measure of legislators’ policy positions, and examine the relationship between this 
measure and the two constituency preference estimates.  The summary measure, because it 
describes a legislator’s decisions across a long series of votes, provides more information than 
any single roll call vote. The measure is also more informative than interest group ratings, which Gay 
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typically are limited to a single policy domain and to the highly salient votes within that domain 
(Snyder 1996). I use Poole’s (2000) optimal classification (OC) procedure to estimate 
legislators’ policy positions from their decisions on 3404 roll calls, a sample that includes all 
votes on all bills originating in the Assembly during the 1997-1998 session.
14  (Unanimous votes 
are not excluded.) Although the estimation procedure allowed for up to two dimensions, the 
results indicate that a single left-right dimension accounts for most of the variation in roll call 
voting.
15  Figure 2 plots legislators’ positions on the first and second dimensions, highlighting 
members from majority-minority Assembly districts. The graph indicates that Republicans, 
including those who represent majority-minority constituencies, vary more widely across the 
policy space than do Democrats.  The pattern is consistent with the earlier finding that the 
Democratic caucus is non-unanimous on far fewer roll calls than the Republicans.  Democrats as 
a whole are clustered on the left, with little intra-party variability along the second dimension. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence of some first dimension variability among Democratic legislators 
from majority-minority districts. In fact, the policy variance among majority-minority Democrats 
is slightly larger than the variance among Democratic legislators from majority-white districts.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of constituency preferences on legislators’ policy 
positions, using the first dimension OC scores as the dependent variable in each regression and 
the districts’ Consumer Populism and Economic Liberalism scores as predictors. For the 
Assembly as a whole (first two rows), I find a “positive” relationship between district 
preferences and legislative behavior.  On average, legislators representing liberal districts (high 
constituency factor score) take more liberal policy positions (low first dimension OC score).  
After including a control for party affiliation, Economic Liberalism remains a statistically Gay 
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significant predictor of legislators’ left-right position, while Consumer Populism has no effect. 
The magnitude of the constituency effect is small: a legislator’s policy position shifts by .17 
standard deviations for each standard deviation change in preferences on the Economic 
Liberalism dimension. Given that the constituency preference estimates, even if measured 
without error, locate voters on two specific policy dimensions, while the scale upon which 
legislators are located reflects choices across a wide range of policy issues, the small effect size 
is not surprising. The effect size is also constrained by the high baseline probability of voting 
with the majority on any single bill; even the non-unanimous roll calls are often quite lopsided. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 The absolute magnitudes of the effects are of less interest here than the relative 
magnitudes across subgroups of legislators. For example, the results show that the two 
constituency dimensions are not equally effective at explaining the policy variation within each 
party caucus. District opinion on Consumer Populism is a statistically significant constituency 
factor only for Democrats, although its effect on those legislators is small. The coefficients on 
Economic Liberalism indicate that its effect on the policy positions of Republican legislators is 
ten times greater than its effect on Assembly Democrats. The model predicts that a one standard 
deviation shift in economic preferences would shift Democratic policy positions by less than 
one-twentieth of a standard deviation, but Republican positions by .61 standard deviations.  
The correspondence between constituency preferences and legislators’ policy positions is 
unaffected by minority districting. The last two rows of Table 3 report results from separate 
regressions predicting policy variation among Democratic legislators from majority-white and 
majority-minority districts. We observe no statistically significant effects associated with district 
opinion on Economic Liberalism for either group of Democratic legislators.  And, to the extent Gay 
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that levels of Consumer Populism influence legislators’ policy positions at all, it is only 
Democrats from majority-minority districts whose behavior varies with their constituents’ 
preferences on this dimension. While this effect is statistically significant, its magnitude is 
substantively small.  
Together with the results from the earlier roll call analysis, the findings suggest that 
minority districting per se is not at odds with legislative responsiveness.  Constituency 
preferences affect the roll call behavior of Democrats from majority-minority districts as often as 
the behavior of Democrats from majority-white districts. And for both groups, this effect is small 
when compared to the effect sizes observed among Republicans.  
Discussion 
The creation of majority-minority electoral districts is a practice that has provoked 
considerable debate among scholars, politicians, and jurists alike.  In recent years, questions 
about the implications of this practice for legislative responsiveness have galvanized opposition 
to these districts from across the political spectrum. In this article, I have examined the oft-
repeated claim that minority districting, by weakening the electoral incentives considered central 
to representative behavior, undermines the relationship between constituents’ policy preferences 
and legislators’ policy decisions.  Across hundreds of individual roll calls, I show that 
constituency preferences are as likely to affect the voting decisions of legislators from minority 
districts as they are the choices of legislators from predominantly white districts. Moreover, 
when comparing the sizes of these effects, I demonstrate that there are no differences across 
types of districts. Despite the low levels of competition and voter turnout often found in 
majority-minority districts, legislators from these districts are no less responsive to the policy Gay 
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demands of their constituents.  Anecdotal evidence aside, the charges of policy shirking by 
majority-minority legislators are unsupported.  
One might reasonably question whether the responsiveness observed in California’s 
majority-minority Assembly districts is exceptional, an artifact of the racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity that characterizes many of these districts and that sets them apart from the more 
segregated, heavily black Congressional districts criticized by Swain (1995) and others. As noted 
earlier, in 17 of the 27 majority-minority Assembly districts in the state no single racial or ethnic 
group accounted for more than half of the population; and in only 3 districts were African 
Americans the largest group.  This heterogeneity may be significant for either of two reasons. 
First, we might expect that with greater racial and ethnic diversity comes greater ideological 
diversity and, therefore, a more competitive electoral environment (as compared to the 
environment in majority-black districts). After all, there is perhaps no social group as uniformly 
liberal and Democratic as African Americans; California’s Assembly districts may fall short of 
the level of ideological homogeneity thought to lead to policy shirking by legislators. Yet while 
these districts lack the racial homogeneity of the archetypal majority-minority district, by at least 
one important measure they are no less ideologically homogenous. The average vote for Clinton, 
in November 1996, in the majority-minority Assembly districts represented by Democrats in 
California was 78.9%, with a standard deviation of 8.5%; in the oft-criticized majority-black 
Congressional districts represented by Democrats throughout the country, the average Clinton 
vote that same year was 78.5%, with a standard deviation of 9.3%.  In terms of ideology, 
California’s majority-minority Assembly districts, despite their greater demographic diversity, 
are not exceptional.  Gay 
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What may be significant about the racial and ethnic heterogeneity of these Assembly 
districts—and what may limit our ability to generalize from the results here—is that such 
heterogeneity, although not a source of greater ideological or partisan competition, may foster 
racial and ethnic competition, as constituency subgroups compete for descriptive representation. 
This competition would be most evident in a district’s (Democratic) primary, which might 
feature a racially and ethnically diverse field of candidates, each trying to mobilize a base of co-
ethnic voters large enough to secure victory. Racial competition may be instrumental in 
motivating the legislative responsiveness observed in California’s majority-minority Assembly 
districts. Thus, caution is in order when generalizing from these results to the behavior in more 
homogenous majority-minority districts. Future research would benefit from a closer 
examination of responsiveness in more racially segregated districts.   
If, however, it is not racial and ethnic competition that motivates majority-minority 
legislators in California to follow the will of their constituents, then the findings suggest that 
constituency influence operates through multiple mechanisms. The literature on Congress is 
replete with evidence demonstrating that reelection fears are effective in securing responsiveness 
(Griffin 2006). Yet the threat of electoral defeat may not provide the only guarantee that a 
legislator will faithfully represent her constituents’ policy preferences (Fearon 1999).  
Constituents in minority districts may exert influence over policy-making not through the threat 
of electoral defeat, but primarily through the election of like-minded legislators. Having 
identified and elected political candidates whose preferences mirror their own, constituents 
ensure that subsequent policy decisions will be consistent with opinion in the district. To the 
extent that this mechanism of constituency influence prevails in minority districts, perhaps as a Gay 
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result of these districts’ ideological homogeneity (Erikson 1978), it offsets the risks believed to 
be associated with electoral security (i.e. an unresponsive legislator).   
Other questions remain about the nature of the constituency-representative relationship in 
majority-minority districts. The empirical analysis is based on a simple model of representation 
in which legislators seek to reproduce their districts’ majority opinion. In light of the multiple 
constituencies that can exist within districts (Fiorina 1974), a more appropriate model might 
allow for legislators to discriminate among these constituency groups, according some more 
attention than others. With that in mind, future research should develop a wider array of 
constituency preference measures, capturing opinion across more policy dimensions and 
measuring the distinct preferences of different subgroups of constituents. In addition to providing 
for a fuller account of the variation in legislators’ policy choices, the additional constituency 
measures might reveal heretofore unknown differences in the voting behavior of legislators from 
majority-minority and majority-white districts.  Gay 
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Notes 
1 Canon (1999) finds that the level of candidate activity, as measured by the number and quality 
of primary challengers, in congressional districts with large black populations is high only when 
such districts are first created or (to a lesser extent) when there is an open seat; in both cases, 
candidate activity dramatically declines in subsequent elections. In 1992, there were four times 
as many candidates per district in newly created black districts as in older ones. 
2 For Latino districts, a large non-citizen population and the relative youth of the population also 
contribute to low voter turnout.  
3 Moreover, recent research suggests not only that weak electoral constraints are not unique to 
majority-minority districts (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004), but also that most legislators are 
ideologically extreme relative to their constituents (Ansolabehere et al. 2001).   
4 In this sense, a referendum- or initiative-based measure of constituency preferences is more 
consistent with the decision-making calculus of legislators, who can perceive these voting 
choices easily and are likely to value them as tangible information about their constituents’ issue 
positions (McDonagh 1993). Additionally, the measure is derived from the behavior of district 
voters, the population most salient to a legislator (Kuklinski 1978; Snyder 1996). 
5 The disadvantage, however, is that in any given year citizens may not vote on a wide range of 
policy issues, thus limiting our ability to generate a complete ideological map of district opinion. 
An analysis of voting returns can uncover only those constituency dimensions substantively 
related to at least one ballot proposition. Constituency opinion may vary across additional 
dimensions. To the extent that other dimensions are factors in legislative decision-making, the 
inability to measure them would lead us to understate the degree to which legislators’ roll-call 
voting patterns agree with their constituents’ preferences.  Gay 
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6 In three-quarters of the majority-minority Assembly districts, candidates in the November 1996 
elections won with more than 62 percent of the two-party vote; in only 25 percent of the 
majority-white districts were the winning candidates similarly successful. Turnout among 
registered voters that year exceeded 60 percent in only a quarter of majority-minority districts, 
compared with 90 percent of majority-white districts. 
7 Redundant measures, when included, dominate an estimated preference dimension. The 
redundant measure excluded was Proposition 212, a campaign finance initiative put on the ballot 
by the California Public Interest Research Group as an alternative to Proposition 208, supported 
by Common Cause.  Of the two measures, I excluded the proposition with the lowest vote 
variability.   
8 The two health care-related initiatives (214 and 216), which address both consumer rights and 
expanded coverage, are factorially complex; for each, the Consumer Populism and Economic 
Liberalism dimensions have loadings above .50.   
9 The sample consists of all non-unanimous votes (i.e. less than a 95 percent majority, excluding 
abstentions) on bills authored by a member of the Assembly. The sample excludes votes on 
constitutional amendments, which must be approved by initiative; concurrent resolutions, which 
do not require the governor’s signature; and joint resolutions, which are non-binding.  For each 
roll call r, I estimate the following logit model:  
) ( ) 1 ( 2 1 0 i
r
i
r r r
i beralism EconomicLi pulism ConsumerPo F v P                
where 
r
i v  is the vote of the state legislator from Assembly district i (1 Yea, 0 Nay), and 
Consumer Populismi and Economic Liberalismi are the factor scores for district i. 
10 Even if legislators always vote their district, there are several reasons why we should not 
expect to find a perfect correspondence between districts’ scores on Consumer Populism and Gay 
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Economic Liberalism and legislators’ vote choices. First, there is certainly measurement error in 
the estimates of constituency preferences. The effect is to bias downward the estimated 
explanatory power of the constituency measures. More generally, Consumer Populism and 
Economic Liberalism are not the only axes of conflict in the legislature (or, for that matter, in the 
districts). Legislators may consider a variety of bills that are not substantively related to either of 
these policy dimensions. On bills that contain neither a consumer rights nor an economic 
element, vote choices will not be correlated with constituency opinion on these dimensions.  
Finally, Fiorina (1974) and others argue that legislators are less concerned with the preferences 
of the median voter in their district than with the preferences of their reelection constituency (see 
also Bailey and Brady 1998; Lewis 1998; Stratmann 1996). Where this is true, preference 
estimates based on majority opinion in districts will have limited explanatory power. 
11 The PRE, calculated as (Minority Vote - Model Classification Errors)/Minority Vote, has a 
value of one if there are no classification errors and zero if the model leads to as many errors as 
the benchmark predictions (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 30). 
12 I control for party by estimating separate logit regressions for Republicans and for Democrats. 
(The number of regressions estimated for a party caucus depends on the number of non-
unanimous roll calls for that caucus.) Similarly, I control for the majority-minority status of the 
district by estimating separate regressions for Democrats from majority-white and from majority-
minority districts.   
13 Not every Assembly bill could be matched to one of the 14 ballot propositions. For Democrats, 
as a whole, I was able to match the bills associated with 64 percent of the non-unanimous roll 
call votes (160 of 250); for Democrats from majority-white Districts, 62 percent (124 of 200); Gay 
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from majority-minority districts, 64 percent (168 of 263). To save space, Table 2 lists only those 
categories for which each subgroup of legislators had at least 5 non-unanimous roll call votes.   
14 The optimal classification algorithm, because of its ability to accommodate a roll call matrix 
with higher levels of correct classification (and thus low error rates) proved much better suited to 
the California Assembly data than the probabilistic W-NOMINATE model (Poole 2000; see 
Rosenthal and Voeten 2004 for discussion of limitations of W-NOMINATE in the context of 
near perfect two-dimensional spatial voting). 
15 Conditioning vote decisions on legislators’ scores on the first OC dimension produces an 
overall classification success rate of 96 percent, an 81 percent reduction in error from the 
benchmark prediction that legislators vote with the majority. Gay 
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TABLE 1:   Predicting Roll Call Vote Choices 
                    
     Strong Party Model  Logits on Constituency Factor Scores 
Legislators 
No. of Non-
Unanimous 
Votes 
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Proportional 
Reduction in 
Error 
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Proportional 
Reduction in 
Error 
Significant  
LLR  
                    
               
All Legislators  1614  0.91  .49  0.88  0.46  .91 
N=80               
               
Republican Legislators  1061       0.80  0.18  .42 
N=37               
               
Democratic Legislators               
All   250       0.84  0.10  .22 
N=43               
Majority-White Districts  200       0.83  0.13  .13 
N=22               
Majority-Minority Districts  263       0.85  0.18  .14 
N=21               
          
Note: Table reports summary goodness-of-fit statistics from 5002 logit regressions (3388 on constituency factor scores; 
1614 on party) predicting legislator's roll call vote choice. Number of observations (N) included in each regression 
reflects size of subgroup of legislators. Entries in second column indicate the number of roll calls on which the identified 
subgroup of legislators was non-unanimous and for which separate logit regressions were estimated. Entries in last 
column are the proportions of roll calls for which likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis of a chance relationship 
between constituency preferences and vote choice at p<.05. Gay 
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TABLE 2:   Predicting Roll Call Vote Choices, Grouped By Committee of Origin 
                             
  All Democrats 
Democrats from Majority-White    
Districts 
Democrats from Majority-Minority 
Districts 
Logit Models by 
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Prop. 
Reduction 
in Error 
Significant  
LLR  
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Prop. 
Reduction 
in Error 
Significant  
LLR  
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Prop. 
Reduction 
in Error 
Significant  
LLR  
Committee of Origin                            
                      
Education  NRC = 12  NRC = 8  NRC = 11 
on Proposition 217  0.85  0.03  0.25  0.84  0.00  0.00  0.80  0.06  0.09 
                      
Judiciary  NRC = 32  NRC = 28  NRC = 30 
on Proposition 207  0.84  0.03  0.06  0.82  0.05  0.00  0.84  0.05  0.00 
on Proposition 211  0.84  0.04  0.13  0.81  0.02  0.00  0.84  0.05  0.10 
on Proposition 213  0.84  0.06  0.32  0.81  0.03  0.15  0.84  0.04  0.03 
                      
Health  NRC = 11  NRC = 5  NRC = 13 
on Proposition 214  0.89  0.10  0.27  0.83  0.08  0.00  0.87  0.06  0.00 
on Proposition 215  0.89  0.11  0.18  0.84  0.14  0.00  0.87  0.02  0.15 
on Proposition 216  0.89  0.13  0.27  0.84  0.16  0.20  0.87  0.06  0.00 
                      
Public Safety  NRC = 55  NRC = 36  NRC = 60 
on Proposition 213  0.84  0.14  0.65  0.84  0.09  0.12  0.79  0.14  0.35 
on Proposition 215  0.83  0.14  0.40  0.84  0.07  0.22  0.81  0.15  0.32 Gay 
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TABLE 2 (cont.):   Predicting Roll Call Vote Choices, Grouped By Committee of Origin 
                             
  All Democrats 
Democrats from Majority-White    
Districts 
Democrats from Majority-Minority 
Districts 
Logit Models by 
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Prop. 
Reduction 
in Error 
Significant  
LLR  
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Prop. 
Reduction 
in Error 
Significant  
LLR  
Percent 
Correctly 
Classified 
Prop. 
Reduction 
in Error 
Significant  
LLR  
Committee of Origin                            
Revenue and Taxation  NRC = 13  NRC = 9  NRC = 13 
on Proposition 217  0.85  0.01  0.23  0.83  0.00  0.00  0.83  0.02  0.00 
on Proposition 218  0.86  0.07  0.23  0.84  0.14  0.14  0.82  0.00  0.00 
                      
Local Government  NRC = 22  NRC = 20  NRC = 27 
on Proposition 217  0.79  0.07  0.18  0.78  0.06  0.10  0.82  0.07  0.15 
on Proposition 218  0.79  0.06  0.27  0.79  0.07  0.15  0.84  0.10  0.15 
           
Note:  Table reports summary goodness-of-fit statistics from logit regressions predicting legislator's roll call vote choice, using the district-
wide vote on a related ballot proposition as the sole independent variable. Roll call votes are grouped by the standing committee to which 
the bill was assigned. Entries in columns three, six, and nine are the proportions of non-unanimous roll calls for which likelihood ratio tests 
reject the hypothesis of a chance relationship between the constituency measure(s) and vote choice at p<.05.  NRC= Number of roll calls on 
which identified subgroup of legislators was non-unanimous; separate logit regressions were estimated for each roll call. 
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TABLE 3:   Predicting Legislator Policy Orientation 
      Constituency Factor Scores    
Legislators 
Legislator's 
Party 
Consumer 
Populism 
Economic 
Liberalism  N  R
2 
                 
           
  -.01 (.01)  -.14 (.01)*  80  .64  All Legislators 
-.29 (.02)*  -.00 (.00)  -.03 (.01)*  80  .92 
           
Republican Legislators    -.02 (.02)  -.11 (.02)*  37  .43 
           
Democratic Legislators           
All     -.01 (.00)*  -.01 (.00)*  43  .26 
Majority-White Districts    -.00 (.01)  -.00 (.01)  22  .04 
Majority-Minority Districts    -.01 (.00)*  -.00 (.01)  21  .17 
        
Note:  Cell entries in first three columns are coefficients (and standard errors) from OLS regressions. 
(Coefficient on constant term not shown; no other predictors included in models.) The dependent 
variable is the legislator's first dimension optimal classification score. * p<.05 
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FIGURE 1:   Estimated Constituency Preferences 
CA Assembly Districts, November 1996 
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FIGURE 2:   Distribution of Legislator Ideal Points 
CA Assembly, 1997-1998 
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